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Differences in Culture, Society,
Economics, and Politics and Their Effect
on Enforcement of Securities Laws
By WATARU HoRIGUCHI*
I. PREWAR LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
SECURITIES TRADING
The end of World War II saw great changes in the regulations that
govern Japanese securities markets. Prior to the war, trading in securi-
ties and commodities was regulated under the Exchange Law of 1893
(Law No. 5 of 1893), the Edict Concerning Exchanges of 1922 (Edict
No. 353 of 1922), and the Executive Regulations Concomitant to the
Exchange Law of 1914 (Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce Order
No. 18 of 1914). But on March 12, 1943, as the war was beginning, the
Japanese Securities and Exchange Law (Law No. 44 of 1943) was
promulgated and became the governing statute for all securities trading.
Under the new law, Japan's eleven stock exchanges were disbanded and
the government established the new Japan Securities Exchange. Trading
on this exchange, however, was halted on August 10, 1945, as the war
began drawing to a close.
The role played by the securities market has changed greatly since
World War II. Only secondary securities markets were really able to
develop before the war. But they were basically speculative in nature,
and the market's role as a provider of funds to industry was extremely
limited. The main reason for this was the dominant role played by the
zaibatsu (giant conglomerate corporations) in both the economy and
society.
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW
During the postwar occupation, the zaibatsu were dismantled as
part of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) policy of
democratizing the Japanese economy, and the decision was made to sell
massive amounts of stock in zaibatsu corporations to the general public.
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In order to raise funds for industry, however, the general public had to be
drawn back into the securities market. Securities exchanges were re-
opened and a secondary market was set up to facilitate the sale of
zaibatsu shares to private investors.
This created the need for a uniform code for the regulation of securi-
ties. In 1947 the Securities and Exchange Law (Law No. 22 of 1947) was
promulgated. This law was designed to protect general investors who
often had little or no experience in trading securities. The law also dis-
solved the Japan Securities Exchange on April 14, 1947. The new Secur-
ities and Exchange Law was modeled after the American system. It
differs from the Japan Securities and Exchange Law of 1943 from the
very first article, which discusses the purpose of the law and emphasizes
that it is designed to protect investors. This definition of the law's pur-
pose still stands unchanged today. The law establishes reporting systems
for the issuance of stocks and bonds, provides for securities exchanges as
membership organizations, and sets up a Securities and Exchange Com-
mittee. Before the law was ever implemented, SCAP decided that the
U.S. system should be introduced to a much wider extent. The entire law
was reworked, resulting in the Revised Securities and Exchange Law of
1948 (Law No. 25 of 1948), with only fifteen articles remaining intact
from the ninety-two article version of 1947. Japan's Securities and Ex-
change Act is therefore generally said to have been passed in 1948.
The revised law was created under the orders and supervision of
SCAP, and features a more widespread adoption of the U.S. system.
While there were numerous revisions, four points are still noteworthy
today: (1) the enhancement of the authority of the Securities and Ex-
change Committee and its establishment as an independent government
agency for the administration of the securities system (article 185 and
following); (2) the effective prohibition of financial institutions from the
securities business (article 65); (3) the prohibition of market manipula-
tion and other similar practices (article 125); and (4) the obligation of
insiders to return all short-term trading profits made on their company's
stock to the company (article 189).
III. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE LAW AND
CIRCUMSTANCES IN JAPAN
Unlike American securities regulations which grew out of specific
needs, Japan's regulations were, to some extent, forced upon Japan.
There have been, therefore, numerous problems in adapting the Revised
Securities and Exchange Law to the Japanese economy and society, and
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there are more than a few regulations which either ignore actual circum-
stances in Japan or do not suit them.
At any rate, as far as securities regulations and securities trading go,
there are special circumstances in Japan arising out of cultural, societal,
economic, and political differences with the United States. These differ-
ences resulted in a good deal of frustration when first trying to enforce
the law, and the law was hindered from functioning as it should.
For example, the requirement of reporting securities issues to the
government, first introduced in 1947, represented a substantial change in
the Japanese system. At the time, there were many who doubted that the
requirement would really assure more protection for investors as the law
intended. Rather, the argument went, it would probably be more damag-
ing since the complexity of the procedures involved would discourage
issuers from offering and selling new securities. However, experience in
the intervening years has shown that, regardless of the original worries,
the reporting system has been a great boon to investor protection. At
present, in fact, it is the disclosure of corporate information, not the lack
of it, that is creating problems.
Another example is the representative suits system, which was not
in the Japanese Commercial Code, but was included in article 189 of the
Securities and Exchange Law. This was hard for many people to under-
stand, although the problem was eventually solved in 1950 when provi-
sions for representative suits were included in article 267 through article
268, paragraph 3 of the Revised Commercial Code. The provisions of
article 189 of the Securities and Exchange Act, however, can only be
termed inadequate when compared to those in the Commercial Code.
This, along with the fact that article 188 (which required that trading by
insiders in their own company's stock be reported and provided the basic
assumptions for article 189) was dropped in the revisions of 1953, meant
that article 189 rarely functioned. The inclusion of reporting require-
ments in article 188 as part of the 1988 revisions was an appropriate
correction of this fault.
Other differences in legal systems between Japan and the United
States have kept the majority of regulations from being as effective as
they could be. Further, the law is written in a kind of "translationese"
which makes it extremely difficult to understand. And even where regu-
lations exist, many are ignored in actual practice.
All this notwithstanding, the Securities and Exchange Law has been
revised over twenty times since its inception, and each time it comes a
little closer to what circumstances require in Japan. As a result, it now
functions much better than it did previously.
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IV. PROBLEMS IN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
LAW AND THEIR SOLUTIONS
One of the reasons that Japan's Securities and Exchange Law has
not functioned as well as it could have is that the country has not had a
watchdog organization comparable to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) in the United States. A powerful supervisory organization
is necessary if the law is to fulfill its stated purpose to protect investors by
ensuring fair trading in securities. Prior to 1952 Japan did have a Securi-
ties and Exchange Committee which, even if it was not as powerful as the
SEC, was an independent administrative agency under the supervision of
the Minister of Finance. The committee was not just an advisory organi-
zation or commission, but an independent parliamentary agency empow-
ered to create its own regulations similar in force to cabinet and
ministerial orders. However, in the government reform that came as the
U.S. occupation was drawing to a close in 1952, the Securities and Ex-
change Committee was disbanded and its authority transferred to the
Securities Division, part of the Ministry of Finance's Financial Bureau
(presently the Securities Bureau, Ministry of Finance).
Unlike the SEC, the Ministry of Finance does not have the right to
make forced searches, and this critical difference is impossible to ignore.
Regulations against insider trading were adopted in 1988 with the addi-
tion of paragraphs 2 and 3 to article 190, as well as punishment provi-
sions, but they are not sufficient. Critics complain the regulations are too
narrow in their application and the punishment is too light. There has
been one case of insider trading prosecuted since the adoption of the reg-
ulations, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. There are many more
cases where insider trading is suspected, but investigations have not been
carried out. Therefore, there is a need to broaden the application and
increase the punishment for violations of insider trading rules.
Like insider trading, market manipulation has also been mostly ig-
nored by authorities. Market manipulation is prohibited in article 125
and punishments are provided (in article 197, paragraph 2), but the regu-
lations are hard to enforce and need to be reworked. There are several
instances in which punishment was levied for market manipulation; thus
this area has been more closely regulated than insider trading.
In the 1988 Kyodo Shiryo market manipulation case, which went as
far as the appellate court, the Ministry of Finance Securities Bureau be-
gan investigating the company and securities house involved, but initially
was unable to get an indictment on the market manipulation charge. Af-
ter the Kyodo Shiryo case, people both inside and outside Japan said that
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the takeover bid system should be made easier to use and that owners of
significant stakes in companies should be forced to report their holdings.
In response to the criticism, Japan revised the law on June 20, 1990,
doing away with the requirement that prior notice of take-over bids be
given and requiring that any party holding over five percent of the shares
in a listed or over-the-counter traded company file a Report of Significant
Shareholdings. These changes will take effect soon.
V. PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE
It is generally agreed that the principle reason why the United States
was unable to suppress market manipulation and make trading fairer in
the early twentieth century was that, until it passed the Securities and
Exchange Act in 1934, it had no institution similar to the SEC and was
consequently unable to create sufficient deterrents. That being the case,
Japan made a grave mistake in doing away with the Securities and Ex-
change Committee in 1952 on the grounds that it was not something to
which the country was accustomed.
Considering the fact that the Ministry of Finance has more to do
than just ensure fair securities trading and protect investors, one ques-
tions whether it is wise to leave the monitoring of securities markets to it.
On July 1 the Ministry of Finance established a Securities and Exchange
Commission charged with monitoring insider trading and price share
manipulation. The commission is composed of seventeen members who,
while not having the authority to conduct investigations, are able to re-
port unfair trading to investigative authorities when they discover it.
The Ministry of Justice loaned the commission a public prosecutor on
July 7. Although the prosecutor works for the commission, the prosecu-
tor will not have the power to conduct forced searches. Thus, while the
monitoring system may have been beefed up a bit, it is still insufficient.
The reason that the antitrust laws are able to function at all is
largely because of the continued presence of the Fair Trade Commission.
That is why it was a grave mistake on the part of Japan to do away with
the Securities and Exchange Committee in 1952 on the grounds that it
was not something to which the country was accustomed. It does not
matter how much laws are revised and regulations strengthened if the
laws are not enforced in accordance with the intent behind them. When
fine tuning legal regulations in the future, it will also be necessary to
make improvements in how the laws are administered, which includes
fleshing out the watchdog organizations for securities markets. There-
fore, it may be wise to consider establishing an institution similar to the
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SEC. This proposal could be criticized by arguing that the creation of a
new institution is against the spirit of current government reforms, but
the need for government reform should not stand in the way of new
things being accomplished.
Japan's Securities and Exchange Law was originally enacted under
pressure from the occupying forces. While it has been reformed by Japan
since then, one characteristic of many recent changes is that they are
again the result of outside pressure. Perhaps this points to the new status
Japan has achieved in the world economy, but perhaps it also indicates
that Japan will have to rely on outside pressure to get a new watchdog
organization put in place.
